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CNRS, Universite´ Paris 1 Panthe´on-Sorbonne (France)
February 22, 2013
Abstract
We develop a model economy adapting Hotelling’s migration law to make indi-
viduals react to the gradient of their indirect utility. In a first version, individuals
respond uniquely to utility differences. In a second phase, we insert our migration
law as a dynamic constraint in a spatial model of economic growth in which a
policy maker maximizes overall welfare. In both cases we prove the existence of a
unique solution under certain assumptions and for each initial distribution of hu-
man capital. We illustrate some extremely interesting properties of the economy
and the associated population dynamics through numerical simulations. In the
decentralized case in which a region enjoys a temporal technological advantage,
an agglomeration in human capital emerges in the central area, which does not
coincide with the technologically advanced area. In the complete model, initial
differences in human capital can trigger everlasting inequalities in physical capital.
Keywords: Migration, Spatial dynamics, Economic Growth, Parabolic PDE,
Optimal Control.
Journal of Economic Literature: J6, C61, R11, R12, R13.
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1 Introduction
In 1929 Harold Hotelling proposed a provocative vision of economics on space. He
postulated a diffusion nature for human migration. Under this vision, individuals react
to changes in salaries and move like a flow along space. Our objective in this paper
is to frame this behavior in a standard economic environment. Agents obtain utility
from their lifetime consumption and they know the mechanisms behind migration and
production.
In 1951, Skellam rediscovered and applied the very same migration law in Biology.
He proposed different diffusion laws for the time-space dynamics of forests and various
species of small animals, that is non-human populations. The difference with Hotelling
is that population diffusion depends on the population concentration, the fertility and
mortality rates which are location specific. Noteworthy, the resulting dynamics coincide
with the trajectories of a model in which individuals move randomly, or more precisely,
in which individuals move following a brownian motion.
There was no application to economics until 1985 and the publication of two works:
Puu (1985) and Beckmann and Puu (1985). Retaking Hotelling’s law, they believe that
population diffusion is due to spatial productivity differentials and not just to fertility
and mortality rates. Puu (1989) puts Hotelling’s law in perspective, integrating both
Skellam and Hotelling’s law. Indeed, Skellam’s law is better suited to describe migration
in an economy where there is no growth. Hence Puu analyzes migration systematically
starting by Skellam’s no-growth case and then adding production to the framework.
In practical terms this means that the diffusion term is made of two factors: the first
directs population towards less populated areas and the second towards areas offering
higher wages. After describing the different laws, Puu (1989) focuses on the stationary
solutions and their stability.
Several authors have produced spatial models in the same direction, analyzing the
economic motives that urge people to migrate. Beckmann (2003) enunciates and solves
the spatial problem presented by Hotelling assuming a convex-concave production func-
tion. Although he can prove that the spatially homogeneous distribution of individuals
is a stable equilibrium solution, he cannot prove the unicity of the solution. The work
closest to ours in the migration literature is Alvarez and Mossay (2006), who propose
a migration law which captures three decisive demographic factors: population growth,
diffusion and migration drift towards preferred regions; and two other relevant factors
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in migration: climate and economic outcomes. They test their theoretical intuition with
US data, which confirm their hypothesis. There are however remarkable differences be-
tween this and the present work. First, their setting is built over a discrete space-time
structure, for which the existence and uniqueness of the solution is not a problem. Sec-
ond, the decisive factors in migration are exogenous, that is, population movements do
not affect the economic environment: production, productivity, technology or environ-
mental quality.
All afore mentioned literature assumes that individuals follow demographic flows, or
at best a combination of the gradients corresponding to the climate and the economy.
In the present work we shall perform a similar exercise first. There is however an im-
portant difference since we endogenize locations’ economic performance. Indeed, since
production requires labor, the final outcome at each location depends on the size of its
population. Afterwards, we consider an economy led by a policy maker who decides on
the optimal trajectory for consumption per capita in an open and bounded one dimen-
sional region, during a time span that stretches from 0 to T . Solving this problem we
can obtain the optimal distribution of population in space and time. The optimal solu-
tion represents the best economic outcome since the policy maker has perfect foresight
and can take into account all simultaneous movements, economic decisions and their
consequences on current and future outcomes.
We prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution to both problems, that is
the centralized and the decentralized versions, but unfortunately, we cannot provide
detailed descriptions of the behavior of the dynamic trajectories. Using an algorithm
developed in Camacho et al. (2008), we illustrate the dynamical properties of our models
in section (5). In the decentralized case we have focused on two issues: the relevance
of an heterogenous initial distribution and of technological differences. As expected, we
show that initial disparities in human capital disappear with time, if this is the unique
difference across space. On the other hand, we show that a population agglomeration is
possible if a region enjoys, even if temporarily, a technological advantage. Most striking:
the agglomeration does not coincide with the technologically advanced region. When
we simulate the solution to the centralized economy, we find another interesting result.
Starting from an heterogenous distribution of population and a spatially homogenous
distribution of physical capital, human capital reaches an homogenous distribution on
space whereas we observe ever-lasting differences in physical capital.
This article is structured as follows. We present our adapted version of Hotelling’s
2
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migration law in section 2. Section 3 studies the decentralized problem while section
4 tackles the centralized economy. Numerical exercises are reproduced in section 5.
Finally, we conclude in section 6.
2 A version of Hotelling’s migration law
Hotelling (1929) migration law postulates that individuals move according to the gra-
dient of salaries. In this logic, individuals move towards the locations with the highest
salaries. As mentioned in the introduction, this is also the modeling strategy adopted
by Puu (1989), Puu and Beckmann (1989), Beckmann (2003), etc. In contrast with this
assumption, we assume that individuals move following the gradient of their utility, that
is, individuals move towards locations which provide higher utility, that we call by u (we
provide more details on u in section 3). Denoting by h(x, t) the amount of individuals
at location x and time t, the dynamics of human capital are described by the following
parabolic partial differential equation
ht(x, t)− hxx(x, t) = ∇xu(c(x, t)), (1)
where x is the gradient in x. We can rewrite (1) as
ht(x, t)− hxx(x, t) = u′(c(x, t))cx(x, t). (2)
In this article, we do not study human capital formation so that we are implicitly
assuming that one individual possesses one unit of human capital.
3 A simple model for spatial migration
Let us start with a simple model to describe individuals migration in an open region
R ⊂ R of space as a response to changes in their utility.1 We assume that the initial
distribution of individuals is known and on the production side, that the production
of the unique consumption good only requires labour. Following the classic literature,
labour transforms into the consumption good according to a neoclassical production
function. Denoting output by Y , we have that
Y (x, t) = A(x, t)F (h(x, t)),
1Results can be easily extended to the case R ⊂ Rn, n > 1.
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where A(x, t) is the technology available at location x at time t. F is a function that
satisfies the following assumption:
(H1) F is a positive, increasing, concave function:
F (·) ≥ 0, F ′(·) ≥ 0 and F ′′(·) ≤ 0.
To simplify our framework, we assume there is no trade in the final good so that indi-
viduals at any location can only consume their production, that is
c(x, t) = A(x, t)F (h(x, t)).
Individuals measure their welfare by means of a utility function u, which verifies
(H2) u is a positive, increasing and concave function of individual’s consumption.
u(·) ≥ 0, u′(·) ≥ 0 and u′′(·) ≤ 0.
With all these elements in hand, we can write the migration law in (2) as:
ht − hxx = u′(AF (h)) [AxF (h) + AF ′(h)hx] . (3)
Gathering the partial derivatives of h on the left hand side, we can rewritte (3) as
ht − hxx − u′(AF (h))AF ′(h)hx = u′(AF (h))AxF (h). (4)
We can assume without loss of generality that points in space are ordered such that
Ax(x, t) ≥ 0, ∀t. The assumption Ax ≥ 0 ensures that the right hand side of (4) is
positive.2 In addition to (4), we need boundary conditions to describe the behavior of
the state variable along δR, R’s border. Following Boucekkine et al. (2009), we adopt
the following boundaries of the Neuman type:
lim
x→δR
hx(x, t) = 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (5)
We believe this condition on the boundary is less restrictive the any other alternative
since we are only forbidding migration at the borders. Indeed, the alternative would be
to provide the values of human capital at the borders for every t ∈]0, T ]. This second
option is far more constraining since it will condition the solution very heavily.
We know that under certain assumptions, the problem (4)-(5) has a unique solution:
2Note that we can make this assumption without loss of generality because if Ax was non-positive,
we could re-order space to obtain Ax > 0.
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Theorem 1 Let assumptions (H1) and (H2) hold and assume that
u′(AF (0))AxF (0) ≥ 0, h(x, 0) ≥ 0,
hold but not all the two are identically zero. Then, problem (4)-(5) has a unique positive
solution.
Before providing the theorem’s proof, note that in a standard economic framework,
u′(AF (0))AxF (0) = 0, because it is assumed that F (0) = 0. We do not need this
assumption here. On the contrary, it would be meaningful to assume F (0) 6= 0. Indeed,
if F (0) = F > 0, then the economy could produce a minimum amount F without human
capital. A strictly positive F translates the existence of productive factors other than
human capital, which are not modeled but which are necessary to produce like physical
capital (introduced in the following section), infrastructures, social capital, etc.
Proof of theorem 1. Our proof relies on theorem 2.5.2 in Pao (1992). In order
to apply Pao’s result we only need to ensure the existence of a positive upper solution
to (4). By definition, hˆ is an upper solution of (4) if
hˆt − hˆxx − u′(AF (hˆ))AF ′(hˆ)hˆx ≥ u′(AF (hˆ))AxF (hˆ).
Next, we need to name the borders of R. We can assume without loss of generality that
R is connected so that δR is made of two real numbers: R1 and R2.
3 Let us define a
positive upper solution hˆ on R:
hˆ(x) = (R2 −R1)β − β(x−R1),
where β = sup{x,t}∈R×[0,T ]A(x, t). This ends the proof.
4 Optimal population dynamics
We present in this section a more complete version of the migration model: there exists
a policy maker in our economy that maximizes aggregated welfare over a finite time
horizon. The policy maker has to choose the optimal trajectory for consumption, taking
into account the consequences that her choices will have on the dynamic evolution of
human and physical capital, denoted by k. To measure the region’s welfare the policy
maker aggregates discounted utility. The policy maker maximizes:
max
c
∫
R
∫ T
0
u(c(x, t))e−ρtdxdt+
∫
R
Ψ(h(x, T ))e−ρTdx+
∫
R
Φ(k(x, T ))e−ρTdx.
3If R was not connected, then we would apply the above proof for each of R’s connected components.
5
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The term e−ρt in the objective function serves to discount utility with time. It is
assumed that the further in time consumption takes place, the less it matters. Time
discount helps the policy maker evaluate consumption trajectories, providing its present
value.
The functions Ψ and Φ value the final states of human and physical capital, respec-
tively. We assume that both Ψ and Φ are continuously differentiable, Ψ,Φ ∈ C1.
As in the previous model, there exists a unique good which is produced at each loca-
tion endowed with positive amounts of physical and human capital. However, contrary
to the first model, the final good can be either consumed or invested in the generation
of future capital. We assume a neoclassical production function, f(k, h), which satisfies
(H3) f(·, ·) is continuous and continuously differentiable in each of its arguments.
In this first attempt to model migration in continuous space, physical capital does
not move in space and consequently, individuals can only invest in their own location.
Therefore, we can describe the dynamics of physical capital as
kt(x, t) = f(k(x, t), h(x, t))− δk(x, t)− c(x, t), (6)
in which we take into account that physical capital depreciates over time at a rate δ.
4.1 Existence and uniqueness
We can gather all the elements and write the policy maker problem as an optimal
control problem in which the policy maker has to choose the consumption trajectory
{c(x, t) : x ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T ]} that solves
max
c
∫ T
0
∫
R
u(c(x, t))e−ρtdxdt+
∫
R
Ψ(h(x, T ))e−ρTdx+
∫
R
Φ(k(x, T ))e−ρTdx (7)
subject to:

ht(x, t)− hxx(x, t) = u′(c(x, t))cx(x, t),
kt(x, t) = f(k(x, t), h(x, t))− δk(x, t)− c(x, t),
h(x, 0) = h0(x) ≥ 0,
k(x, 0) = k0(x) ≥ 0,
limx→δR hx(x, t) = 0,
(8)
6
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for all x ∈ R, t ∈]0, T ]. Similarly to theorem 1 our first result ensures the existence
of a solution for (8) for given c under certain assumptions:
Theorem 2 Under assumptions H2 and H3 and for given c, the system of PDE de-
scribed in (8) has a unique positive solution if the initial condition for human capital is
not identically zero.
Proof. Notice that the PDE for h does only depend on h and c, so that we can prove
the existence of a solution for h given c, independently of k. Then, we shall proceed
as in theorem 1 and apply theorem 2.5.2 in Pao (1992), that is, we need to ensure the
existence of a positive upper solution for
ht(x, t)− hxx(x, t) = u′(c(x, t))cx(x, t). (9)
We can build an upper solution hˆ as
hˆ(x, t) = u′(c¯)c¯t,
where c¯ = supx,t c(x, t). By definition, hˆ ≥ 0. Then, we can compute hˆ partial deriva-
tives: hˆt = u
′(c¯)c¯, and hˆxx = 0. We have proven then that hˆ is a positive upper solution,
ensuring the existence of a unique solution h to (8) for a given c.
Finally, for the unique solution couple (h, c), we can consider the dynamic equation
for k. For every x, (6) is an ordinary differential equation in t with known initial value
k0(x). Under H3 we can ensure that the solution to (6) is unique for every x.
4.2 Optimal necessary conditions
We use the Ekeland variational method to obtain necessary conditions in the form
of Pontryagin’s principles. We follow the method developed by Raymond and Zidani
(1998), (1999) and (2000). We can write the value function V associated to our problem
in which we shall penalize the objective function introducing the state constraints:
V (c, h, k, λ, µ) =
∫
R
∫ T
0
u(c(x, t))e−ρtdtdx+
∫
R
Ψ(h(x, T ))e−ρTdx+
∫
R
Φ(k(x, T ))e−ρTdx
− ∫
R
∫ T
0
λ(x, t) (ht(x, t)− hxx(x, t)− u′(c(x, t))cx(x, t)) dtdx
− ∫
R
∫ T
0
µ(x, t) [kt(x, t)− f(k(x, t), h(x, t)) + δk(x, t) + c(x, t)] dtdx.
(10)
7
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Let us assume that an optimal solution exists {(c(x, t), h(x, t), k(x, t)) : (x, t) ∈
R × [0, T ]}. Then, we can write any other solution to our problem as the addition of
the optimal solution plus a deviation from it, measured by a parameter :
c(x, t) = c∗(x, t) + C(x, t),
h(x, t) = h∗(x, t) + H(x, t),
k(x, t) = k∗(x, t) + K(x, t).
(11)
With this new writing, we can express V as a function of . Then, in order to obtain
optimality conditions, we can take the derivative of V with respect to  and equate it to
zero so that we minimize the distance to the optimal solution. However, before doing
so, we need to re-arrange some terms of V using integration by parts:
V () =
∫
R
∫ T
0
u(c(x, t))e−ρtdtdx+
∫
R
Ψ(h(x, T ))e−ρTdx+
∫
R
Φ(k(x, T ))e−ρTdx
+
∫
R
∫ T
0
h(x, t) (λt(x, t) + hx,x(x, t)) dxdt−
∫
R
λ(x, t)h(x, t)|T0 dx+
∫ T
0
λ(x, t)hx(x, t)|δR
− ∫ T
0
h(x, t)λx(x, t)|δRdt−
∫
R
∫ T
0
λx(x, t)u(c(x, t))dtdx−
∫ T
0
λ(x, t)u(c(x, t))|δRdt
− ∫
R
µ(x, t)k(x, t)|T0 dx+
∫
R
∫ T
0
k(x, t)µt(x, t)dtdx
− ∫
R
∫ T
0
µ(x, t) [−f(k(x, t), h(x, t)) + δk(x, t) + c(x, t)] dtdx.
(12)
Now we can take derivatives with respect to  which yields:
V ′() =
∫
R
∫ T
0
u′(c(x, t))e−ρtC(x, t)dtdx+
∫
R
Ψ′(h(x, T ))H(x, T )e−ρTdx
+
∫
R
Φ′(k(x, T ))K(x, T )e−ρTdx+
∫
R
∫ T
0
H(x, t) (λt(x, t) + hx,x(x, t)) dxdt
− ∫
R
λ(x, T )H(x, T )dx− ∫
R
∫ T
0
λx(x, t)u
′(c(x, t))C(x, t)dtdx− ∫
R
µ(x, T )K(x, T )dx
+
∫
R
∫ T
0
K(x, t)µt(x, t)dtdx−
∫
R
∫ T
0
µ(x, t) (−fk(k(x, t), h(x, t))K(x, t)dtdx
− ∫
R
∫ T
0
µ(x, t) (−fH(k(x, t), h(x, t))H(x, t) + δK(x, t) + C(x, t)) dtdx.
(13)
Note that in parallel to the boundary conditions of the state variable, we need that
for all x ∈ δR:
h(x, t)λx(x, t) = 0,
λ(x, t)u(c(x, t)) = 0.
(14)
8
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One can obtain necessary conditions to our maximization problem grouping together
the terms that multiply C, H, K, etc. as follows:4

C : u′(c)e−ρt − λxu′(c)− µ = 0,
H : λt + λxx + µfh = 0
K : µt + µ (fk + δ) = 0,
(15)
plus an additional terminal condition for λ and µ, for every x ∈ R :[
Ψ′(h(x, T ))e−ρT − λ(x, T )]H(x, T ) = [µ(x, T )− Φ′(k(x, T ))e−ρT ]K(x, T ).
Since H and K will remain unknown distances, the above condition needs to be split
into two:  λ(x, T ) = Ψ
′(h(x, T ))e−ρT ,
µ(x, T ) = Φ′(k(x, T ))e−ρT .
(16)
We can transform the non-autonomous equation linked to C, re-defining the co-state
variables λ as λeρt and µ as µeρt. The set of conditions in (15) and (16) becomes

λt + λx,x + µfh − ρλ = 0
µt + µ (fk + δ − ρ) = 0,
λ(x, T ) = Ψ′(h(x, T )), ∀x ∈ R
µ(x, T ) = Φ′(k(x, T )), ∀x ∈ R
h(x, t)λx(x, t) = 0, x ∈ δR.
(17)
Once we obtain a solution to (17), we compute c using the remaining necessary
conditions, that is u′(c) (1− λx) = µ plus the boundary condition λ(x, t)u(c(x, t)) = 0
for x ∈ δR .
Theorem 3 Under assumptions H2 and H3, if (h, k) is a solution of (8), then there
exists at least a couple (λ, µ), which solves (17).
Proof. We apply here theorem 2.1. in Raymond and Zidani (1999).
4For the ease of exhibition, we abstract from spatial-temporal references. We shall write k for k(x, t),
h for h(x, t), etc.
9
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4.3 The reverse time parabolic equation
We hit here a cornerstone of economic modeling in a continuous space setting. Contrary
to standard growth models, the modeler cannot work with an infinite time horizon. It is
the time reversed nature of the parabolic PDE associated to λ which forces the modeler
to choose a finite horizon since one can not reverse time in an infinite horizon problem.
We explain the importance of this point next.
The PDE associated to λ in (17) does not belong to any of the big families of partial
differential equations whose behavior have been analyzed in the literature. Nevertheless,
if one reverses time, that is, if we change λ by λ˜(x, t) = λ(x, T − t), then we obtain a
parabolic equation
λ˜t(x, t)− λ˜xx(x, t)− µfh (k(x, T − t), h(x, T − t)) + ρλ˜(x, t) = 0. (18)
This change of variable is necessary in order to prove the existence and uniqueness of
solution to (17). It is clear now why we cannot study infinite horizon economies: if
T = ∞ then we cannot reverse time in the PDE for λ and hence we cannot prove
the existence of a solution nor its uniqueness. We say in this case that the problem is
ill-posed.
We prepare now the problem for the numerical simulations that follow in section 5.
For the simulation purposes, we are interested in reducing the size of our system. Note
that we can substitute µ from the first equation into the second:
λ˜t(x, t)− λ˜xx(x, t)− µfh (k(x, T − t), h(x, T − t)) + ρλ˜(x, t) = 0,
and gather the equations linked to C and K to reduce the dimension of the system,
eliminating µ. If we do so, we obtain the dynamics of consumption as follows:
u′′(c)
u′(c)
ct − λ˜x,t
1− λ˜x
= ρ− δ − fk.
We can write our problem as the following system of partial differential equations for
10
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which the uniqueness of the solution has been proven for every x ∈ R and t ∈]0, T ]:
ht(x, t)− hxx(x, t) = u′(c(x, t))cx(x, t),
λ˜t(x, t)− λ˜xx(x, t)− µfh (k(x, T − t), h(x, T − t)) + ρλ˜(x, t) = 0,
kt(x, t) = f(k(x, t), h(x, t))− δk(x, t)− c(x, t),
u′′(c(x,t))
u′(c(x,t)) ct(x, t)− λ˜x,t(x,t)1−λ˜x(x,t) = ρ− δ − fk(k(x, t), h(x, t)),
h(x, 0) = h0(x) ≥ 0 and k(x, 0) = k0(x) ≥ 0,
λ(x, 0) = Ψ′(h(x, 0)),
limx→δR hx(x, t) = 0, limx→δR λx(x, t) = 0 and λ(x, t)u(c(x, t)) = 0 if x ∈ δR.
(19)
Due to the complexity of the above system, we devote next section to numerical
exercises that will help to illustrate its dynamic characteristics.
5 Numerical exercises
In this section, we illustrate numerically some of the characteristics of the economies
described in sections 3 and 4. Through the simulations, we try to provide an answer to
a crucial question: can initial disparities vanish with time? Although disparities may
arise from many fronts, we focus here on disparities on the initial endowment of human
capital and on production technology. Our aim is to furnish an answer which takes into
account population movements. For example, locations endowed with less initial human
capital can offer higher salaries, attracting individuals so that disparities will disappear.
However, if the technology level is not high enough, then these locations cannot offer
larger salaries implying further loss of human capital since migration will take place
towards more rewarding regions.
The section is divided in two: the first subsection illustrates the decentralized model,
in which individuals can freely move in space, whereas the second one concerns the model
with a policy maker who computes the optimal distribution of individuals in time and
space.
Without loss of generality, space is defined as the interval [0, 1] that we divide in 2
regions of equal size, [0, 0, 5] and [0, 5, 1]. Although the two regions setting may seem
oversimplifying , it helps underlining the model’s driving forces. The parameters values
11
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adopted in the exercises are shown in Table 1.
A Technology 1
α Share of human capital 0.75
δ Depreciation rate 0.05
ρ Time discount rate 0.015
Total Population 90
Table 1: Parameter values for section .
5.1 The decentralised economy
The reader familiar with the heat equation knows that initial differences in temperature
disappear in time, all else equal. Although the migration law in (4) could look like
a heat equation it is not one, due to the term u′(c)cx. In effect, the utility gradient
involves a term on hx and another on Ax once we substitute c for Ah
α. We investigate
whether initial differences disappear with time. In the first exercise, initial population
is unequally distributed:
h(x, 0) =
 100, if x ∈ [0, 0, 5],
10, if x ∈ [0, 5, 1].
(20)
As figure 1 shows, initial differences disappear very quickly, as with the heat equation.
Next, we explore the behavior of the model when one of the regions enjoys a techno-
logical supremacy. If a region enjoys even if temporarily a sufficiently large advantage,
then ever-lasting differences are created. To illustrate this point we assume that tech-
nology is defined as
A(x, t) =

10, if x ∈ [0, 0, 5], ∀t,
10 + 10(5− t), if x ∈ [0, 5, 1], ∀t < 5,
10, if x ∈ [0, 5, 1], ∀t ≥ 5.
An agglomeration of individuals emerges around the central location from the be-
ginning (see figure 2). From start, population strongly agglomerates around the center.
Then, the agglomeration area spreads but the hump shaped distribution of individuals
12
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Figure 1: Decentralised economy. Human capital dynamics when initial population is hetero-
geneous.
persists in time. One may wonder how this agglomeration of human capital is possible.
Indeed, this solution could not be reached nor foreseen in a standard model in economic
growth with a finite number of locations. A classical analysis in a setting with a finite
number of locations would predict a migration flow from the low salary region towards
the high salary region until salaries are equalized.
On the one hand, the better technology in [0.5, 1] increases productivity and regional
salaries, all else equal. This force attracts human capital into [0.5, 1]. However, on the
other hand, once human capital increases their marginal productivity decreases and
hence their salaries. In the end, central locations larger than 0.5 enjoy a better tech-
nology which will attract individuals. Nevertheless, their agglomeration lower salaries.
As a result, locations close to 0.5 but smaller than 0.5, can benefit from this agglomer-
ation since they may offer higher salaries because human capital marginal productivity
is larger.
5.2 The policy maker problem
To enrich our understanding of spatial migrations, we would like to illustrate the policy
maker problem with a numerical exercise using the algorithm developed in Camacho
et al. (2008). We assume a standard utility function exhibiting constant elasticity of
13
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Figure 2: Decentralised economy. Human capital dynamics when technology is heterogeneous
substitution: u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ , where σ = 1.25
5. Furthermore, we choose a Cobb-Douglas
production function in human and physical capital: F (h, k) = Akαh1−α, where α = 0.75.
Individuals are heterogenously distributed while physical capital is spatially homoge-
nous. In particular, h(x, 0) is as in (20) and k(x, 0) = 10, for all x ∈ R.
The most salient outcome is that the human capital heterogeneity triggers an un-
equal accumulation of physical capital (see figures 3 and 4). Indeed, regions with more
human capital accumulate more physical capital. Note that since physical capital is not
allowed to flow over space, these differences persist in time and this despite the steady
homogenization of human capital with time.
Once again, this result is somewhat at odds with the standard literature in growth
theory. It is usually predicted that 2 regions endowed with the same production tech-
nology, even with unequal levels of physical capital will reach the same level in the
long-run, when their marginal productivities are equal.6 The usual adjustment mecha-
nism that allows convergence is the location’s savings: it is expected that a rich region
with low marginal productivity of capital will save less and diminish its level of capital.
At the same time, the poorly endowed region, with relative high marginal productivity
5Note that with σ = 1.25, the objective function becomes negative. This is by no means a problem
since the utility function satisfies all required assumptions.
6See for instance the β-convergence concept in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003).
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Figure 3: Centralised economy. Human capital dynamics when initial population is hetero-
geneous.
saves more and increases its stock of capital. In this framework we have an additional
adjustment tool, namely human capital migration. A region can adapt its savings but
adjustment is faster if human capital flows towards more rewarding regions. We have
shown with this simple numerical exercise that spatial convergence is not accomplished
even when individuals freely migrate. Nevertheless, we believe that all locations in space
will enjoy an equal allocation of human and physical capital if both factors could flow
in space without barriers.
6 Conclussions
Building upon Hotelling’s seminal work, we have developed a model economy adapting
Hotelling’s migration law to make individuals react to the gradient of their indirect
utility rather than to the gradient of salaries as in the original law. We have proceeded
in two steps, first we analyze the dynamics of human capital as if individuals responded
uniquely to utility differences. Under certain assumptions on the utility function, we can
prove the existence of a unique solution for each initial distribution of human capital.
In a second phase, we insert our migration law as a dynamic constraint in a standard
model of economic growth in which a policy maker maximizes overall welfare. In this
case too we can prove the existence of a unique solute under certain assumptions and
15
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Figure 4: Centralised economy. Physical capital dynamics when initial population is hetero-
geneous.
for each initial distribution of human capital.
Unfortunately, we cannot obtain further analytical results and we need to proceed
through numerical simulations. Although these do not constitute formal proves, they
shed light on some extremely interesting properties of the economy and the population
dynamics. In the decentralized case in which a region enjoys a temporal technological
advantage, an agglomeration in human capital emerges in the central area. The most
striking part of this result is that this agglomeration surges from the beginning and that
the central area is made of locations both from the technologically advanced subregion
and from the less-advanced subregion. In the simulation of the complete model, we
find that initial differences in human capital can trigger everlasting inequalities in the
locations stock of capital.
The framework we have presented pretends to be the first stone of a more sophis-
ticated world description. We leave for further research the comparison of the optimal
solution with the decentralized solution, using as measure aggregated welfare over space
and time. Also interesting would be to address the issues of social integration, com-
plementarity between different types of labor. One could produce a more sophisticated
model introducing the education sector, private or publicly funded, etc.
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Appendices
A An algorithm to solve forward-backward systems
of parabolic PDE
We start building a grid in discrete time and space that will correspond to the continuous
setting [0, R]× [0, T ]. Space will be an interval made of R ∗Dx, that is, the grid points
are separated by a distance Dx, i.e. [0, R] ≈ {Dx, 2 ∗Dx, 3 ∗Dx, ..., R ∗Dx}. Similarly,
the time interval will be divided into T ∗ Dt subintervals and we will consider the
extreme points of these. If in continuous time variables were evaluated at (x, t), their
discrete versions will be evaluated at the grid vertices (n, j) where n = 1, ..., N and
j = 1, ..., T ∗Dt.
Once we have built the grid, we need to discretize all variables and write appropriate
definitions for their partial derivatives. We shall adopt the following definitions:

ht(x, t) =
hn+1j −hnj
Dt
,
hx(x, t) =
hn+1j+1−hn+1j
Dx
,
hxx(x, t) =
hn+1j−1−2hn+1j +hn+1j−1
Dx2
,
(A.1)
where n is the closest point of the spatial grid to x, which is computed as n = floor(x ∗
Dx). Then, n is the closest time point in the grid to t, n = floor(t ∗Dt).
Then, the discrete version of our original equation in (4) is:
hn+1j −hnj
Dt
− h
n+1
j−1−2hn+1j +hn+1j−1
Dx2
− u′(AnjF (hnj ))AnjF ′(hnj )
hn+1j+1−hn+1j
Dx
=
u′(AnjF (h
n
j ))F (h
n
j )
An+1j+1−An+1j
Dx
.
(A.2)
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